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underwriting from the requirement of the allegation of one discriminatory interstate sale. At the present, it may be assumed that in order to
invoke the Robinson-Patman Act, a claimant has alternate avenues of
procedure depending upon the forum he chooses. Along with an allegation that the defendant is engaged in an interstate concern, the Robinson-Patman claimant may either contend that one of the discriminatory
sales was interstate in character, or that "the interstate operations of the
defendant were used to underwrite local discriminatory pricing practices."'45 Consistency is imperative. Evidence of a need for action by the
Supreme Court to clarify any existing disparity as to the jurisdictional
scope of the Robinson-Patman Act was voiced by Mr. Justice Black dissenting to the denial of certiorari in the Willard case. He stated:
Refusal to grant certiorari here means that this Court is allowing
the economic resources and staying power of an interstate company
to be used with impunity to destroy local competition, precisely
the sort of thing the Robinson-Patman Act aimed to prevent....
Judgments like this one left standing here make it difficult indeed
for small, independent, local companies to survive against the
of their larger and more powerful interstate
predatory assaults
competitors. 46
Michael D. Wagner
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FROM THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT. Campbell v. Sonford Chemical
Company, 480 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1972, writ
granted).
THIRD PARTY

Charles Campbell was injured on or about December 10, 1964 while
working as an employee for the Texas Welding Works, a company performing work for the Sonford Chemical Company. Campbell did not
file his claim for workmen's compensation until September 8, 1967,
after more than two years had passed from the date of the accident. The
Industrial Accident Board held that Campbell had "good cause" for not
Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1972).
46 Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 373 US. 934, 935, 83 S. Ct. 1534,
1535, 10 L. Ed.2d 691, 691 (1963).
45 Littlejohn v. Shell
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filing within the six month time period as prescribed by statute,1 and
awarded him $618 in compensation. An appeal was taken from this
award, and judgment was entered in Campbell's favor on May 7, 1969.
Campbell then filed this suit on May 15, 1969 against the Sonford
Chemical Company alleging that their negligence was the cause of his
injury, and that he should recover under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Texas Employers' Insurance Association filed a petition of
intervention alleging that it was the compensation carrier for the Texas
Welding Works, and that it was subrogated to the rights of Charles
Campbell against the Sonford Chemical Company in the amount of
$618 as a result of its payment to Campbell under the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 2
The Sonford Chemical Company answered by pleading the two year
statute of limitations.3 Campbell and the carrier replied that there
was good cause shown for not having filed the compensation claim
earlier as shown in the adjudication of the compensation claim, and
filed a supplemental pleading alleging that the statute of limitations
was tolled from the date of the injury until the date of the final disposition of the workmen's compensation claim, and since two years had
not elapsed from that final disposition, the suit was not barred. Sonford
Chemical Company made a motion for summary judgement, arguing
that no compensation claim had been filed within two years from the
date of the injury which could have tolled the statute. The trial court
sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Held Affirmed. Where a workman is injured in a case for which compensation is payable under circumstances creating a legal liability in some
party other than the compensation subscriber, the employee must make
an election to proceed against the compensation carrier or the third
party within two years from the date of his injury. Otherwise his cause
of action against the third party would be barred by the two year statute
of limitations, and his claim for compensation would be lost as the
4
compensation carrier would have lost its right of subrogation.
The remedies available to an employee injured within the scope of
his employment under circumstances giving rise to liability of some
party other than his employer are controlled by article 8307, section 6a
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 5 Under this statute the courts
1TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
2 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967).
3 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6 (1958).

4 Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 237, 241 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972,
writ granted).
5 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967):
Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this law was caused under
circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the subscriber to
pay damages in respect thereof, the employ6 may at his option proceed either at law
against that person to recover damages or against the association for compensation
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have ruled that if the employee elects to maintain an action against the
third party, he will be barred from recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 6 but if he first makes his claim for compensation, he or
the compensation carrier may subsequently proceed against the third
party after the compensation claim is disposed of in what is generally
called a third party action. 7 The compensation carrier is subrogated to
the rights of the injured employee,8 and if the employee causes the
carrier to lose this right by releasing the third party,9 or by a settlement
or adverse judgement, 10 he will be precluded from receiving compensation.
Statutes of limitation are applicable to situations arising under section 6a depending upon which option the injured employee elects to
follow. If the injured employee elects to pursue his common law remedy
against the negligent third party, his action will fall within the ambit of
article 5526, the two year statute of limitations." Under this statute,2
limitations will begin to run from the time the cause of action arises,1
ordinarily when an injury, however slight, is sustained in consequence
under this law, but not against both, and if he elects to proceed at law against the
person other than the subscriber, then he shall not be entitled to compensation under
this law. If compensation be claimed under this law by the injured employd or his
legal beneficiaries, then the association shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured
employd in so far as may be necessary and may enforce in the name of the injured
employ6 or of his legal beneficiaries or in its own name and for the joint use and
benefit of said employd or beneficiaries and the association the liability of said other
person, and in the case the association recovers a sum greater than that paid or assumed by the association to the employd or his legal beneficiaries, together with a
reasonable cost of enforcing such liability, which shall be determined by the court
trying the case, then out of the sum so recovered the association shall reimburse itself
and pay said cost and the excess so recovered shall be paid to the injured employ6 or
his beneficiaries. The association shall not have the right to adjust or compromise
such liability against such third person without notice to the injured employ6 or his
beneficiaries and the approval of the board, upon a hearing thereof.
6 See, e.g., Employers' Indem. Corp. v. Felter, 277 S.W. 376 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925,
jdgmt adopted); Fort Worth Lloyds v. Essley, 235 S.W.2d 700 (rex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1950, writ ref'd); Stowell v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 259 S.W. 311 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1924, no writ).
7 See, e.g., Fort Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 246 S.W.2d 865 (1952); Hart v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 493 (1945); Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v.
Perry, 127 Tex. 102, 91 S.W.2d 1052 (1936); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126
Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936).
8 Tax. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967).
9 See, e.g., Hart v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 498 (1945); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Warneke v. Argonaut
Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 834 (rex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10 See, e.g., Hart v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 493 (1945); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Employers' Indem.
Corp. v. Felter, 277 S.W. 376 (rex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).
11 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958):
There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action
shall have accrued, and not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the following
description:
6. Action for injury done to the person of another.

12 Id.
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of a wrongful act of another. 18 The running of the statute is not postponed until damages result from the wrong, even though damages are
not sustained until a later date. 14 Neither the plaintiff's lack of knowledge as to his cause of action, nor his belief that his injuries are not
serious will stop the statute from commencing. 5
If the injured employee elects to proceed under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, the period in which he must file his claim is prescribed by article 8307, section 4a.' 6 Under this section the employee
must file his claim within six months from the date of the injury unless
"good cause" is shown as to why there is a failure to file within that
period. 17 There are a considerable number of cases determining what
constitutes good cause for delay, many of which hold that where an injury is latent or not believed serious, 8 or where there is a lack of knowledge as to a cause of action,' 9 good cause is shown. In some instances
18 Robertson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 122 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938,
writ ref'd).
14 See, e.g., Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336
(1954); Stillwell v. City of Fort Worth, 140 Tex. 560, 169 S.W.2d 486 (1943); Houston Water
Works v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36 (1888); Thompson v. Barnard, 142 S.W.2d 238
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940), aff'd, 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (1942); Robertson v. Texas
& N.O.R.R., 122 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938, writ ref'd); Bowers V.
Schubert, 220 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1920, no writ); Fairbanks, Morse &
Co. v. Smith, 99 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 101 Tex. 24, 102 S.W. 908 (1907).
15 Plaintiff's lack of knowledge will not toll the statute of limitations unless fraud is
present. See generally, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 148 S.W.2d 905 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1941, no writ); Wichita Nat'l Bank v. United States Fidel. & Guar. Co., 147 S.W.2d 295
(Tex.Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941, no writ); Thompson v. Barnard, 142 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1940), aff'd, 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (1942); McCook v. Amarada
Petr. Corp., 93 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ dism'd); Real Estate
Land Title & Trust Co. v. Street, 85 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ
dism'd); Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Speer, 212 S.W. 762 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919,
no writ).
16 Txx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967):
Unless the Association or subscriber have notice of the injury, no proceeding for compensation for injury under this law shall be maintained unless a notice of the injury
shall have been given to the Association or subscriber within thirty (30) days after the
happening of an injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease,
and unless a claim for compensation with respect to such injury shall have been made
within six (6) months after the occurrence of the injury or of the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease; or, in the case of death of the employee or in the
event of his physical or mental incapacity, within six (6) months after death or the
removal of such physical or mental incapacity. For good cause the Board may, in
meritorious cases, waive the strict compliance with the foregoing limitations as to
notice, and the filing of the claim before the Board.
17

Id.

18 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brown, 463 S.W.2d 473 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sapien, 458 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); King v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 416 S.W.2d 533
(rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Chambers,
233 S.W.2d 893 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maines, 468 S.W.2d 496 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1971, no writ); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Youngblood, 466 S.W.2d 329 (rex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Consolidated Underwriters v. Pittman, 388 S.W.2d
315 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clark, 23
S.W.2d 405 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929, writ dism'd). But see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.
King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Sup. 1969); Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 154 Tex. 424,
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there has been good cause for delay when compensation claims were not
filed within two years of the accident. 20 Because of the good cause provision, limitations may in effect be waived under section 4a. There
is no provision within the two year statute of limitation which has the
21
same effect.
The court in the instant case was confronted with the task of construing the aforementioned statutes in a situation in which a conflict
developed between them. The court sought to determine how section
4a, which waived limitations for good cause, affected the applicability
of the two year statute of limitations in a third party action where more
than two years had elapsed from the time of the accident before a claim
for compensation was filed.
The court's approach was to qualify section 4a by article 5526 so that
limitations could be waived on the compensation claim for good cause
shown; but limited the extent of good cause to a two year period of
time in third party actions. 22 To reach this decision the court conceded
that the filing of a compensation claim has the effect of tolling the
statute of limitations on a third party action, and that the limitations
remained tolled until the ultimate disposition of the compensation
claim. 23 The filing of a claim however, cannot revive a cause of action
already barred. 24 Surely if the employee elected to sue the third party
after two years had passed from the date on which the accident occurred,
his cause of action would be barred by limitations. 2 For the same
reason, the compensation carrier would fail in the subrogation suit to
recover the amount of compensation paid to the injured employee, and
27
since the right of subrogation is a valuable right, 26 granted by statute,
the employee must make his election to proceed under the Workmen's
Compensation Act within two years from the date of the accident to
279 S.W.2d 299 (1955); United States Fidel. & Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359 S.W.2d 914 (rex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20 See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cobb, 131 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1943); Traveler's Ins. Co.
v. Price, III F.2d 776 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 676, 61 S. Ct. 43, 85 L. Ed. 435 (1940);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Little, 96 S.W.2d 677 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1936, writ
dism'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fricker, 16 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1929, writ ref'd).
21 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6 (1958).
22 Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 237, 241 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ granted).
23 Id. at 241.
24 Id. at 241.
25 Id. at 239.
26 A release of the third party by the injured employee, a settlement, or adverse judgment
will bar the injured employee from receiving workmen's compensation. See, e.g., Hart v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 493 (1945); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Employers' Indem. Corp. v. Felter, 277
S.W. 376 (rex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); Warneke v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 407
S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967).
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prevent the carrier from being divested of his statutory right.28 The
court felt that such a solution would put the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in harmony with the two year statute of limitations rather than in conflict. 2
Although not mentioned in the instant case, Employers' Indemnity
Corp. v. Felter 0 presented a situation in which these statutes were construed. What the Texas Commission of Appeals said as to the application of the two year limitation statute when in conflict with good cause
shown for delay is particularly relevant:
It is not necessary for us, in view of what we have just stated, to
determine whether or not the Accident Board can, by virtue of the
last part of section 4a of part 2 of the act, permit a party to recover
compensation when such party delays beginning proceedings so
long that the insurance company's rights under the subrogation
section of the same act would be lost by limitation.... We do not

pass upon the point, but will say that these two sections of the
same act should be so construed as to give effect to both, if possible.
...That can be done by not permitting such delay under section
4a as will deprive the company of its rights of subrogation under
section 6a. 81
Basic to the decision in the instant case and the dicta in Felter is the
assumption that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when an employee is injured. 2 In a common law
tort action, no doubt this is the case.88 There is considerable conflict
however, as to whether or not this is the situation in a third party action.
Many decisions have agreed with the contention in Campbell; the cause
of action accrues at the time of the accident and limitations begin to
run from this time, and the filing of a claim for compensation will simply toll the statute from running.8 4 Other decisions have held, however,

28 Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972,
writ granted).
29 Id.
80 277 S.W. 376 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).
81 Id. at 379. The court's decision in Felter was based upon the premise that res judicata
would be successfully pleaded by the third party in a subrogation suit by the compensation
carrier since Mrs. Felter had sued the third party and received an adverse judgment before
she made her claim for compensation.
82 Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972,
writ granted).
83 See, e.g., Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Sup. 1967); Houston-Am. Fin.
Corp. v. Travis, 343 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); MissouriK.-T. Ry. v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Robertson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 122 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938,
writ ref'd).
84 Mendiola v. United States, 401 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1968); Standard Oil Co. v. Swinney,
201 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1953); Bruner v. Skibsaktieselskabet Hilda Knudsen, 123 F. Supp.
903 (S.D. Tex. 1954); Webster v. Isbell, 71 S.W.2d 342 (rex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1934),
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that rather than the statute of limitations being tolled during the pendency of the compensation claim, the cause of action has not accrued,
and therefore limitations have not initially begun to run until the final
5
disposition of the compensation claim .
The decisions holding that limitations do not begin to run until
final disposition of the compensation claim are based upon the theory
that the right to sue the negligent third party is a contingent one, and
that the compensation carrier has no right to maintain an action for the
benefit of the injured employee, and to recoup its compensation payments until they have paid or assumed to pay the compensation claim.38
"Where a party's right depends on the happening of an event in the
future, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins
to run, only at the time when the event happens."3 7 If one has no legal
right to sue, he has no cause of action.

8

Not only is the carrier's right

to sue contingent upon a future event, so is the apportionment of damages. In a third party action the compensation carrier is allowed to recover the amount of compensation paid to the injured employee, and
the employee is entitled to recover any excess above his compensation
award.8 9 Damages cannot therefore be apportioned between the carrier
40
and the employee until compensation has been paid or assumed.
rev'd on other grounds, 128 Tex. 626, 100 S.W.2d 350 (1937); Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v.

Texas Power & Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, writ ref'd). See
also cases holding that where there is a legislative prohibition which prevents one from
asserting his rights, the law of limitations is suspended: T. B. Meeks Co. v. Hudgins, 22
S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929, no writ); Manes v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 295 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1927, writ ref'd); Lippsitz v. First Nat'l Bank,
288 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926), aff'd, 293 S.W. 563 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
jdgmt adopted).
85 Steele v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 128 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Mourning v. Crown
Stevedoring Co., 417 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, no writ); Judice v. Sumner
Sollitt Co., 346 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Derr v.
Argonaut Underwriters Ins. Co., 339 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Thompson v. Graham, 318 S.W.2d 102 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Hollins v. Lone Star Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Yeary v. Hinojosa, 307 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W.2d 339 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Texas & P. Ry., 129 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Texas Power & Light Co., 35
S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, writ ref'd): "If we be mistaken in our conclusion
that the statute of limitation did not begin to run until the entry of final judgment ....
the [statute] is tat least] suspended." Id. at 784.
86 See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Texas & P. Ry., 129 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Texas Power
& Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, writ ref'd).
87 37 C.J. Limitation of Actions § 154 (1919) (now 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 110
(1948)], cited in Webster v. Isbell, 71 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1934), rev'd
on other grounds, 128 Tex. 626, 100 S.W.2d 350 (1937); Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Texas
Power & Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, writ ref'd).
.88 Borger v. Hazelwood, 199 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1946, no writ).
89 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967).
40 Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Texas Power & Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 2, Art. 7

1972]

CASE NOTES

Had the court in the instant case followed the reasoning that the
cause of action does not accrue until compensation has been paid or
assumed, they would have avoided what it appears they feared most;
that the compensation carrier would lose its right of subrogation. 41 The
court could have then allowed injured employees to recover compensation, rather than compelling them to sustain the expense of their
injuries themselves, and given effect to the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, both the carrier's right to subrogation and the good
cause provision without a conflict with the two year statute of limitations.
Three prior decisions by the Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals, the
42
jurisdiction deciding Campbell, apparently followed this theory.
These cases, involving compromise settlement agreements of compensation claims, held that limitations against the third party action began
to run when the compromise settlements were approved by the Industrial Accident Board.43 It is interesting that the court said the cause of
action does not accrue until compensation is paid or assumed, 44 and
that there is two years from this date in which to file against the negligent third party,45 rather than holding that the cause of action accrued
at the date of the accident, and that limitations were simply tolled dur-

ing the pendency of the compensation claim. Given the facts in these
cases however, 46 the decisions would be the same regardless of which

theory was applied. Possibly the court did not feel obligated to draw a
distinction, or even consider whether or not one existed, until a factual
situation such as that of Campbell arose where over two years had passed

from the date of the accident before a compensation claim was even
filed.
Dallas 1931, writ ref'd); Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Riley, 26 S.W.2d 682 (rex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1930, no writ).
41 Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ granted).
42 Judice v. Sumner Sollitt Co., 346 S.W.2d 135 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hollins v. Lone Star Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W.2d 273 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
43 Judice v. Sumner Sollitt Co., 346 S.W.2d 135 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hollins v. Lone Star Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
44 Judice v. Sumner Sollitt Co., 346 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hollins v. Lone Star Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 276 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W.2d 273 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45 Judice v. Sumner Sollitt Co., 346 S.W.2d 135 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hollins v. Lone Star Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 276 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W.2d 273 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
46 All compensation claims were filed within a two year period from the date of the
accident.
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Even if limitations could be plead successfully against a carrier in a
subrogation suit as the court feared in the instant case, the more reasonable rule in the light of statutory intent would be to allow recovery by
the injured employee under workmen's compensation. In Holloway v.
Texas Indemnity Insurance Co.47 the court stated:
Clearly this provision [article 8307, section 4a] operates to remove
all cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law from
the statute
of limitations applicable in ordinary personal injury
48

cases.

In other decisions time and again the Texas courts have held that the
primary purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to benefit and
to protect the employee, 49 and that the Act should be construed liberally
in favor of the injured workman."0 In Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining
Co. 11this sentiment was well expressed:
Workmen's compensation laws have become part of our public
policy. The object of the laws was to do away with the issues of
negligence, unavoidable accident, assumed risk, contributory negligence, and other like issues, and to fix the amount recoverable free
from any uncertainty. The old system of settling disputes was unsatisfactory, and modern business methods demanded that compensation for injuries to employees be not controlled by the fault or
negligence of the employer, but should rest upon broader, more
humane, and certain rules.5 2
In effect, the decision in Campbell places the carrier's rights paramount to that of the employee in situations where there is good cause
for delay in filing for compensation and a period of two or more years
has elasped from the time of an accident. Only when the injured employee takes affirmative action which causes the carrier to lose his right
40 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
Id. at 78; accord, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Guidry, 128 Tex. 433, 437, 99 8.W.2d
900, 902 (1937); cf. Gilley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co, 35 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1931, holding approved) in which it was held that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are special laws relating to a special subject, and should be given effect even
though a different conclusion might be reached under the general law. It could possibly
be argued that article 8307, section 4a is a special law which waives limitations for good
cause without restriction, and should prevail over the general law, the two year statute
of limitations. Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 557, 285 S.W. 1084, 1087 (1926).
49 See, e.g., Fidelity & Union Cas. Co. v. McLaughlin, 134 Tex. 613, 135 S.W.2d 955
(1940); Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938); Brinkley v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, no writ); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Peppers, 133 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.).
50 See, e.g., Miears v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950); Huffman
v. Southern Underwriters Co., 133 Tex. 354, 128 S.W.2d 4 (1939); Industrial Acc. Bd. v.
Parker, 348 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938).
52 Id. at 453, 116 S.W.2d at 676 (emphasis added).
47
48
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